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Abstract 
Under the current monetary framework, central banks are limited in their pursue of price 
stability and full employment due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. This 
happens because negative nominal rates on bank deposits – deemed a necessary condition 
for negative nominal rates on bank credit – will cause a massive flight from deposits to 
cash, as cash pays zero nominal interest rates. 
To counter this constraint, we propose a new monetary architecture that by making 
the central bank the single source of funding for bank loans at negative nominal interest 
rates,  enables banks to profitably extend credit at negative nominal rates - while still 
paying zero interest rates on their clients’ deposits. 
We find only two objections with our proposal. First, people could start living off 
credit obtained at negative interest rates. Second, households and firms which would 
otherwise use their deposits to fund expenditures would instead fund them through loans 
obtained at negative interest rates. While the first objection can be easily prevented by 
requiring banks to provide negative rate loans conditional on their use to purchase goods 
and services, the second cannot be completely solved. But it can be minimized through 
loan-to-value requirements. 
Overall, we conclude that nominal negative interest rates on bank credit can, in fact, 
be achieved through minimal changes in the current process of money creation. 
 
Keywords: Monetary Policy; Negative Interest Rates; Zero Lower Bound; Bank Credit; 
Money Creation. 
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Before the global financial crisis, the world was supposedly “prepared” for an economic 
slowdown. Governments had space for fiscal stimulus, and perhaps more importantly, 
central banks (CBs) had room for conventional monetary policy. However, aggregate 
demand (AD) fell so much in the crisis that even cuts to zero of CB nominal interest rates 
were unable to bring economies back to full employment (FE). As a result, CBs had to 
opt for other monetary tools, mainly quantitative easing (purchase of sovereign and 
private bonds in exchange for newly created reserves) and forward guidance (providing 
information about future monetary policy decisions, in order to change the expectation of 
future short-term interest rates, and consequently influence today’s long-term interest 
rates).  
The European Central Bank (ECB) began using unconventional monetary policies in 
2008, starting with the fixed-rate full allotment to provide an unlimited amount of 
liquidity to banks (Constâncio, 2018). Afterwards, in 2012, the ECB announced the 
undertaking of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) in the secondary market for 
sovereign bonds in the Euro Area (Banco de Portugal, 2017). This was crucial to ensure 
the stability of some Euro Area members, as their government bond yields were too high 
for those countries to issue new debt in the primary market. Thirdly, between March 2015 
and December 2018 the ECB delivered another package of non-standard monetary policy 
through the Asset Purchase Programme (APP), which included the purchase of not only 
government debt but also corporate debt (although in a much lesser extent). The APP was 
reintroduced in September 2019, when the ECB announced the purchase of 20 billion 
euros per month (ECB, n.d). Other CBs followed or were already implementing similar 
strategies. 
Although these policies have helped to stabilize output and unemployment, the 
existence of a zero lower bound limit on the CB interest rates constraints the ability of 
monetary authorities to counter cyclical downturns, unemployment, and deflation 
(Assenmacher & Krogstrup, 2018). Additionally, one could argue that unconventional 
policies have not been enough for CBs to achieve their goal of price stability. For 
example, the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) reference rate has been near zero for two decades, 
and despite its massive effort to boost inflation through asset purchases - as of July 2020, 
the BoJ’s balance sheet reached 120 percent of GDP – the inflation rate has remained 
well below the target of 2 percent (the average inflation for the period 2010:08 to 2020:06 
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was 0.5 percent). The same can be said for the Euro Zone, where the ECB’s balance sheet 
reached 53.9 percent of GDP (as of July 2020) and yet inflation has rarely reached the 
target. So, increasing the monetary authorities’ toolkit is certainly something we should 
look for.1 
When economies were hit by the Covid pandemic, the major CBs did not have much 
room - under conventional methods - to first secure flow of credit in the various money 
markets (to avoid a liquidity crunch) and then to help the economic recovery. The Federal 
Reserve (Fed) and the Bank of England (BoE) cut the rates towards zero. The ECB 
already had the refinancing rate at zero. And all increased the purchase of private and 
public bonds.2 
On the past nine crises, the Fed had cut the interest rate by an average of 5.5 percent 
(Yellen, 2016), which is substantially higher than the Fed’s 1.75 percent cut – to zero - in 
the current recession. Why did the Fed stop at the zero level? The reason is simple. The 
Fed was afraid that it might create a flight from deposits with negative rates into cash. 
The fact that CBs have not been able to cut interest rates into deep negative levels 
and, thereby, deliver negative interest rates on bank credit is attributed to the impossibility 
of having banks financing negative interest rate loans with their clients’ deposits at even 
more negative interest rates. Under the current system, banks finance the extended loans 
mainly through the reserves created by deposits.3 Commercial banks’ business is centred 
on the activity of extending loans at a certain interest rate that must be higher than the one 
paid on their sources of funding. Therefore, extending bank loans at negative rates could 
never be possible without even more negative interest rates on bank deposits – but this 
would most certainly result in massive withdrawals. Because of this, the current 
macroeconomics literature that discusses ways to break the zero lower bound on interest 
rates attempts to eliminate the incentive to withdraw deposits even when the nominal 
 
1 Contrarily, Reifschneider (2016) argues that asset purchase and forward guidance can compensate for the 
inability of the Federal Reserve to cut short-term reference rates below zero. In fact, according to model 
simulations, in the US a combination of interest rate cuts, forward guidance, and asset purchase could 
replicate the same economic effect of a hypothetical reduction of the short-term interest rate to deep 
negative levels. 
2 The ECB increased the size of the APP envelope by an additional 120 billion euros (to be used throughout 
the year) and introduced the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP), which consisted of an 
envelope of 750 billion euros (ECB, 2020a) that later was increased by an additional 600 billion euros 
(ECB, 2020b). The Fed announced an unlimited purchase of bonds, including private bonds in the primary 
market (Fed, 2020). Similarly, the BoE put forward a bond buying programme of 200 billion British pounds 
to be used to acquire non-financial investment-grade corporate bonds and UK government bonds, which 
later was increased by an additional 100 billion British pounds (BoE, 2020). 
3 For example, in 2018, deposits accounted for 55 percent of Euro Area banks’ total liabilities (ECB, 2020c). 
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interest rates are deeply negative – for example, by phasing out large denomination notes 
in order to make large-scale hoarding of cash much more costly (Rogoff, 2017). 
The goal of this paper is to propose a different way of breaking the lower bound. 
Instead of developing a solution that allows banks to charge negative interest rates on 
their clients’ deposits without creating a flight into cash as Rogoff does, we propose a 
new monetary architecture that allows banks to borrow all the funds they need to provide 
loans to the economy from the CB at deep negative interest rates, so that they can 
profitably lend at negative interest rates while paying zero interest rates on their clients’ 
deposits. 
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the different approaches 
proposed in the literature to deal with the zero lower bound problem. Chapter 3 provides 
a comprehensive explanation of how money is created in modern economies. Bearing this 
in mind, chapter 4 presents a new monetary architecture capable of generating negative 
interest rates on bank credit even with non-negative interest rates on bank deposits. 
Chapter 5 concludes. 
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2. REVIEW OF ALREADY PROPOSED WAYS TO BREAK THE ZERO 
LOWER BOUND 
After the Global Financial Crisis, all major CBs decreased their short-term policy rates to 
near zero in order to reduce unemployment (see figure 1). The American and British 
economy eventually recovered to FE, allowing their CBs to tighten monetary policy. 
However, for the Euro Zone economy, those interest rate cuts were not enough to bring 
it back to FE, and, as a consequence, the ECB policy interest rate has been stuck at the 
lower bound level since then. 
Figure 1 - Central banks' reference interest rate and size of their balance sheet 
 
The reference rates are the following: ECB euro short-term refinancing rate, US federal funds target rate - 
upper bound and UK Bank of England official bank rate. 
Source: European Central Bank, Federal Reserve Board, Bank of England and Bloomberg, August 2020. 
So, a question arose: what if the ECB could lower its policy rate to a deeper negative 
level? Maybe the economy would return to FE. But, is it possible? 
2.1 CONSTRAINTS ON BREAKING THE ZERO LOWER BOUND 
For a long time, it was assumed that CBs could not set policy interest rates at negative 
values. CBs feared that lowering their short-term reference rates too deep into the 
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However, recent events like the ECB negative interest rate policy in its deposit facility 
rate in June 2014, where the rate was cut to minus 0.1 percent, questioned the existence 
of a zero lower bound. Therefore, the debate now is how much lower can policy rates go, 
where is the effective lower bound? As of October 2020, the ECB’s deposit facility rate 
is at minus 0.5 percent. One could argue that the interest rate on deposits can be as 
negative as the cost implicit in holding cash: the inconvenience of living without 
automated payments, web access to account balances, storage and transportation costs, 
and protection over theft. 
The recent experience with some CBs has shown that commercial banks have been 
hesitant in reducing the deposits rate further to negative values, even with policy rates in 
the negative spectrum.4 Banks do not want to initiate mass withdrawals, therefore, they 
have been very cautious with their deposits’ rates (Bech & Malkhozov, 2016). The 
problem is that no one knows where is the effective lower bound, that is, how far can we 
go until banks have no other option than to pass the cost to their clients, and if they do, 
how deeply negative the rate can be before it creates a flight into cash. This is the million-
dollar question of practically all the literature involving breaking the lower bound. 
2.2 PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO BREAK THE ZERO LOWER BOUND 
As Rogoff (2017) highlights, there are four different methods to break the lower bound: 
removing cash from circulation, enforce negative interest rate on cash (through some 
technological approach), decoupling cash from electronic bank reserves, and finally, 
making holding cash as costly as having a deposit pay a negative interest rate. While 
recognizing the contribution of each theory, we will discard the second option, as paying 
negative interest rates on currency is far from being a viable solution.5 
We review each of these methods next. 
  
 
4 The Denmarks NationalBank, The European Central Bank, The Swiss National Bank, and The Bank of 
Japan. 
5 This idea, introduced by Gesell (1916), consisted of worsening the store of value property of money by 
imposing a tax on holding money to improve it as a medium of exchange during times of financial distress 
when people saved money rather than lend or spend it. By requiring the purchase of stamps to be attached 
to the back of each banknote, it would be possible to impose a negative interest rate (the cost of the stamp) 
on paper currency. Keynes (1936) objected to the idea, as it would not be possible to impose such a system 
without affecting the liquidity of money. 
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Removing cash from society 
Given the nature of cash, that is, the fact that it pays a zero nominal interest rate, it would 
make sense to remove it completely from the economy to enable banks to charge negative 
rates on deposits and thus enable them to set negative rates on credit. And although there 
are other benefits that come with removing cash – i.e., less tax evasion and criminal 
activities – cash still plays an important role in our society. Cash still plays an important 
role for small to medium transactions in several economies, and removing it prematurely, 
before electronic means of payment are well entrenched within the various groups of 
society - for example, the older population tend to be less exposed to electronic means of 
payment - could disrupt the economy (Assenmacher & Krogstrup, 2018). Besides, cash 
is fundamental in preserving privacy and securing against a systemic electronic failure. 
Having said this, if there are other ways (that cause less frictions) to break the lower 
bound, then those should be considered. 
Decoupling cash from electronic money 
An idea proposed by Buiter (2007, 2009) and Agarwal & Kimball (2015), and later 
reinforced by Assenmacher & Krogstrup (2018), is that the CB could set up two different 
currencies with an exchange rate between them, allowing cash to lose value in relation to 
electronic money in periods of negative CB interest rates. 
This would work in the following way: the CB divides the monetary base into two 
separate domestic currencies, cash and reserves issued only electronically. Reserves 
would pay a nominal interest rate, which could be negative if needed. The CB would set 
a spot cash reserve conversion rate between reserves and cash. Commercial banks would 
have to deposit or withdraw cash from the CB not at par value but at the conversion rate, 
which would be adjusted daily. At the end of every business day, the CB would announce 
the next day rate of conversion. So, if the CB reduced the interest rate to, say, minus 5 
percent, after one year, every unit of account in electronic money would represent 1.05 
unit of account in paper currency. This would avoid an early run into cash. 
For this dual currency system to work and to be able to remove the lower bound from 
the economy, it is necessary that the electronic money becomes the unit of account: every 
nominal contract would have to be expressed in electronic money, quoted prices for 
goods, services and financial assets, wage contracts, taxes and so on. Cash would remain 
a means of payment, but the price in cash would deviate from the electronic money’s 
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prices, and so there would be two different inflation rates in the economy. However, this 
solution raises two problems. 
First, it would require legal and regulatory reforms. The CB would have to announce 
the electronic money as the legal tender. Buiter (2007) recommends that all contracts 
where the state is a counterpart should be written in electronic money, that taxes should 
be payable only by electronic money and that only contracts specified in electronic money 
could be legally enforced. Without such reforms, the system would seize to prevent the 
lower bound on paper currency, as people could simply withdraw their deposits and 
transact only with cash. 
Second, it would be necessary that when the interest rate on electronic currency is 
negative, prices denominated in cash must be constantly changing in the same proportion 
as the conversion rate. If not, people would still prefer to withdraw their deposits and 
continue their lives purchasing goods and services using cash. So, this would not be 
practical because it would force businesses to constantly change their price tags. 
Another objection pointed by Rogoff (2017) is that after a period of negative interest 
rates, both currencies would no longer be exchanged at par, and if the monetary authority 
were to restore the par, it would have to pay a positive interest rate on electronic money, 
which could conflict with other monetary objectives. 
Making holding cash as costly as paying negative interest rates on deposits 
Mankiw (2009) proposed that the CB could make holding cash less attractive by 
announcing that a year from now it will pick at random a digit from zero to nine, and all 
the currency with a serial number ending in that digit would no longer be considered legal 
tender. This would make the expected return on holding currency equal to minus 10 
percent. In this situation, economic agents would prefer to hold a deposit at any nominal 
interest rate as long as it paid more than minus 10 percent. But this does not solve the 
problem. As soon as the CB announced the new policy, agents would withdraw their cash 
(to avoid the negative interest rate on deposits) and later deposit it back just before the 
date of the policy. 
To solve the problem, it would require a small change to Mankiw’s solution. Every 
week, the CB would choose at random a number from 0 to 1,000 and all the banknotes 
with a serial number ending in that number would no longer be considered legal tender. 
Since the probability of having one banknote with the serial number ending in that last 
number is 0.1 percent, the annual expected return to hold cash would be 0.1 percent times 
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52 (total number of weeks), or minus 5.2 percent. Thus, because they are risk averse, 
economic agents would prefer to hold a deposit at any nominal interest rate higher than 
minus 5.2 percent.6 And if the CB wanted to further decrease the nominal interest rate, it 
could simply increase the frequency of the policy or increase the quantity of numbers that 
would drop off circulation each week. 
An alternative solution would be to make hoarding money more costly by phasing out 
large denomination notes. This approach, proposed by Rogoff (2017), takes into 
consideration the fact that the zero lower bound level of interest rate is not actually zero, 
but a small negative number. Therefore, by eliminating the largest denomination 
banknotes, it becomes harder and more expensive (higher shipping and storage costs) to 
hold money in the form of currency and in this way make households and firms want to 
hold it in the form of deposits even if they imply negative interest rates. 
This approach not only reduces the effective lower bound to a deeper negative level, 
but it also supports the argument that although currency is becoming less important in 
transactions (as opposed to credit and debit cards), it is still the main medium of exchange 
in criminal transactions and tax evasion (Rogoff, 2015). Activities that would become 




6 Note that there are no risk lover agents (i.e., agents that simultaneously prefer to face a higher risk and a 
lower expected return), because even if there are, these agents will eventually become insolvent. 
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3. THE NEW VIEW ON MONEY CREATION 
Contrarily to other proposed ways to break the zero lower bound, we develop a solution 
that enables banks to extend loans at negative interest rates while paying non-negative 
interest rates on deposits. But, before introducing our solution, it is necessary to 
understand the process of money creation in the economy. 
Thus, in this chapter we explain how money is created in the economy. This 
explanation first emerged with Moore (1988) and has recently spread into the mainstream 
after the Bank of England published a paper on money creation by McLeay et. al. (2014). 
3.1 MONETARY BASE VS. MONEY 
To understand the creation of money, it is necessary to distinguish between monetary 
base (MB) and money. MB consists of currency in circulation and reserves held by banks, 
where the majority of these reserves take the form of banks’ deposits at the CB. On the 
other hand, money represents all means of payment, that is, all titles that allow 
households, businesses, and the State to buy goods and services, pay incomes and debts. 
There are two types of money: currency and bank deposits, which represent most of the 
money in modern economies. 
3.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CREDIT AND DEPOSITS 
The old view 
The old view of money creation takes banks as intermediaries from savers to debtors, 
where the deposits received by savers are used to extend loans to those who need money. 
However, the act of saving would not in fact create deposits or “funds available” for banks 
to lend. The reason is as follows: when households decide to save money in a bank 
account instead of spending, that deposit is created at the expense of deposits that would 
otherwise go to companies. Therefore, an act of saving does not make additional deposits 
available. 
The old view of money creation takes money as exogenous to the economy by 
assuming that money is created as a result of the initiative of the CB to create reserves. It 
is assumed that, through the money multiplier, the CB can decide the quantity of money 
in circulation by creating a certain quantity of reserves. The CB injects a certain amount 
of MB, say 100 euros, into the banking system, and by determining the reserves 
requirement, say 10%, the banking system will successively extend credit until the 
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maximum amount of money is reached, which in this case and assuming no currency 
circulation will be 1,000 euros (Mishkin, 2013, ch. 14). 
The new view 
However, the money multiplier theory is not a valid representation of reality. 
In fact, (see Moore, 1988; Howells, 1995; Palley, 2002 and McLeay et. al., 2014) the 
CB implements monetary policy not by setting a certain amount of reserves but by 
choosing the price at which banks can borrow reserves, that is, by choosing the interest 
rate. Specifically, the process of money creation can be described as follows. At any time, 
banks can borrow any amount of reserves they desire from the CB at the interest rate set 
by the CB as long as they have collateral. The CB is the lender of last resort, and so it 
cannot refuse reserves demanded by banks, as this could endanger the stability of the 
financial system. Banks then apply a spread to the CB interest rate and thereby set the 
interest rate at which they are willing to lend money to economic agents. At this level of 
interest, agents will demand a certain amount of loans and, no matter whether banks own 
reserves or not, they will grant the amount of credit they consider to be creditworthy.7 
When a bank extends a loan, it does not hand the agent the amount of the credit worth 
of notes and coins (as suggested by the old view of money creation). Instead, the bank 
credits the agent’s bank account with a bank deposit the size of the credit. This is the 
moment that new money is created.  
Note that the net wealth of the bank and of the household are not affected. The reason 
is the following. When the bank extends the loan, it creates a liability (the household 
deposit), but at the same time, it obtains an asset (the bank loan). In turn, the household 
acquires an asset (the deposit) and, at the same time, a liability (the loan). More generally, 
the money created by banks and held by households, businesses, and the State is not net 
wealth; it is an asset (the checkable deposit) offset by a liability (the bank loan) of the 
same value. 
But if banks create money, it is only logical to assume that they also destroy money, 
which in fact happens. When economic agents who got a bank loan in the past eventually 
pay the loan back, the bank simply crosses out the agent’s deposit from its liabilities and, 
at the same time, crosses out the bank loan from its assets. Hence, the payment of a bank 
 
7 Constâncio (2011) states that first banks take their credit decisions and only then look for the necessary 
reserves at the CB.  
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loan leads to the destruction of a checkable deposit (money) of the same amount. Here 
we are ignoring interest payments for simplicity. 
In sum, the creation of money is an endogenous process that results from the initiative 
of economic agents to demand credit and is carried out by commercial banks until all 
demand for worthy credit is satisfied. Thus, the bank credit is the source of money 
creation, and, as explained above, it is the bank credit that creates deposits and not the 
other way around. 
3.3 THE PROCESS OF MONEY CREATION 
This section details the process of money creation carried out by commercial banks. We 
will first illustrate assuming the existence of two Eurozone banks. Afterwards, we will 
assume a single bank. Finally, we will describe a more realistic approach. 
Two banks 
To understand why banks do not need to hold deposits in order to grant credit, let us take 
the case of a commercial bank (B1) that lends 100 euros to a company (see figure 2). The 
moment the credit is extended, a checkable deposit (CD1) of 100 euros is opened in the 
company’s account. To do this, the bank starts by needing to get 1 percent of that amount 
in reserves from the CB, 1 euro. The reason is that, since January 2012, Eurozone banks 
are required to hold 1 percent of deposits as reserves. However, the company will surely 
use the CD1 to make a payment to another economic agent, who is likely to be a customer 
of another bank, say, B2. Given this, B1 ends up forced to get 100 euros in reserves from 
the CB in order to hand them over to B2.  
However, at the same time, B2 is very likely to extend a loan to an agent that will 
make a payment in favor of B1. If this credit is also equal to 100 euros, then no reserves 
will be sent by each bank as the two payments cancel out. Therefore, at the end of the 
day, each bank only needs to borrow from the CB reserves equal to 1 percent of the 
deposits it creates: 1 euro (=1% x 100 euros). 
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Figure 2 - Money creation by two banks 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
A single bank 
Imagine now an economy where there is only one commercial bank. This is a good way 
of understanding how small is the amount of reserves banks need to get from the CB in 
order to extend credit to the economy. 
Consider the case of a household (H1) who wants a mortgage loan of 100 euros (see 
figure 3). The single bank grants the loan by crediting the value of the loan to the deposit 
account of the household and, at the same time, adding the mortgage loan to its assets’ 
column. This creation of 100 euros of money will require the single bank to obtain only 
1 euro in reserves. The moment H1 buys the house, it writes a cheque in favour of the 
seller of the house (H2). But since there is only one bank in the economy, H2 will deposit 
the cheque of 100 euros in the very same bank. This simply deletes the deposit of H1 and 
creates a deposit of the same amount for H2. No change in the bank’s total deposits 
occurs, and therefore it will still be required to hold only 1 euro. 
But the bank does not stop here. If there is more creditworthy demand for credit, the 
bank will keep on granting loans. Suppose that a third agent asks for a loan, for example, 
a company (C1) that needs 100 euros to pay a supplier (C2). Through the same 
mechanism mentioned before, the bank will end up creating 100 euros in the form of a 
new checkable deposit, again by borrowing only 1 euro in reserves. The conclusion is that 
the single bank seems to be a “money machine”: it can create any amount of deposits with 
almost no CB funding. However, as we will explain in the next section, there are 
limitations to the amount of credit the single bank can extend.  
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Figure 3 - Money creation by a single bank 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
An approach to reality 
The previous examples were meant to illustrate that banks can extend credit with only a 
small amount of reserves that can be easily acquired at the CB. Although this is true, in 
reality, there are other factors that must be taken into consideration.  
First, the previous examples assumed that the money created through the extension of 
bank credit would be passed on to other economic agents, keeping the form of a checkable 
deposit. In reality, part of that checkable deposit might turn into other forms of money. It 
can happen that some will be withdrawn, and some will be converted into a savings 
deposit, say, 10 and 60 percent, respectively. In this case, only 30 percent of the money 
created will remain as a checkable deposit. The difference in this scenario is that the bank 
will have to back 100 euros of credit with a loan of 10.3 euros from the CB: 100 percent 
of the 10 euros withdrawn and 1 percent from the 30 euros checkable deposit.8 
In this case, the profits of the bank will be lower because while the bank earns interest 
on the 100 euros lent, it pays interest on the deposit of 60 euros savings plus on the 10.3 
euros of reserves. If we assume the interest charged on the loan equal to 3 percent, the 
CB interest rate equal to 1 percent, and the interest rate paid to savings deposits also 1 
percent, then the bank’s profits will be equal to:9 
 
8 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that savings deposits do not need to be backed by reserves. 
9 Due to logistic costs, the interest rate on savings deposits tends to be lower than the central bank interest 
rate. Here we assume it to be the same. 
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3% 𝑥 100€ − 1% 𝑥 10.3€ − 1% 𝑥 60€ = 2.3€ 
Note that in the case in which 100 percent of the money created would remain in the 
form of a checkable deposit, the bank’s profits from extending the loan was almost the 
same as the revenue generated from it, because the bank did not pay interest on the 
checkable deposits, and only needed to back it up with reserves equal to 1 percent of the 
deposit created. The profits would thus be higher, equal to: 
3% 𝑥 100€ − 1% 𝑥 1€ = 2.99€ 
Second, assume now that B1 extends a credit of 103 euros – instead of 100 euros - to 
a customer that makes a payment in favour of a customer of the second bank (B2). And 
that B2 extends a credit of only 100 euros to a customer that makes a payment in favour 
of a B1’s customer. In this case, B1 will be obliged to send 3 euros in reserves to B2, and 
B2 will need to back the resulting deposit of 103 euros with 1.03 euros in reserves.  
In this scenario, the funding costs increase for B1 since it now must borrow 3 
additional euros at 1 percent (the CB interest rate). However, the B1 also sees its revenue 
rise by 3 euros times the interest rate charged to the customer, say 3 percent. Therefore, 
the bank will end up increasing its profits, even though it was forced to send 3 euros in 
reserves to B2. As for B2 is concerned, it now needs reserves equal to 1.03 euros and 
receives 3 euros from B1. Thus, it will end up with 1.97 euros in excess reserves, which 
it can then deposit at the CB to benefit from the deposit facility interest rate. 
3.4 LIMITATIONS ON BANKS’ CAPACITY TO CREATE MONEY 
Although banks are responsible for the creation of money, they are limited in the amount 
of money they create. This happens because there are three main factors that limit the 
quantity of loans banks are able to extend (McLeay et. al., 2014). 
1st) Banks are limited by the amount of credit demanded by economic agents 
Once banks set the interest rate on their loans, the quantity of credit and money they will 
create will not be decided by banks but rather by the amount of (creditworthy) demand 
for credit by economic agents. 
On the other hand, note that as economic agents use the loans to spend on goods and 
services, they will pass that money on to others. How these economic agents then respond 
will influence the quantity of money in the economy. There are two possibilities. First, 
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they continue to spend, and so that money continues to be passed on to other agents. The 
second possibility is that the economic agents that receive the money from the ones that 
contracted the loans immediately use that money to repay existing bank debts. In this 
case, the money is quickly destroyed. 
2nd) The monetary policy carried out by the CB 
If the interest rate of loans influences the number of loans demanded, then the monetary 
policy carried out by the CB can limit the amount of credit extended and thus of the 
quantity of money created, as it directly impacts banks’ interest rates. In particular, if 
households and companies start to demand too much credit, this excessive increase in 
credit will lead to an excessive increase in demand for goods and services, which in turn 
will lead to inflationary pressure in the economy. As soon as the CB predicts a future 
increase in inflation above its target, it will increase its interest rate in order to mitigate 
the excessive demand for credit. This will reduce the amount of credit in the economy 
and, therefore, the creation of money by banks. 
3rd) Regulatory policies 
Prudential regulation is a third restriction on money creation, as it acts as a brake on 
banks’ lending activity.  
Regulation limits the amount of bank lending via capital requirements.10 For example, 
Basel III - an internationally agreed set of measures developed by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision after the Great Financial Crisis (BIS, n.d) - enforces banks to 
hold a minimum level of capital. Internationally active banks are obliged to the following 
capital requirements (BIS, 2017, 2019): 
- Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) must be at least 4.5 percent of risk-weighted assets 
at all times plus a buffer of 2.5 percent. CET1 (common shares and stock surplus, 
retained earnings, other comprehensive income, qualifying minority interest, and 
regulatory adjustments) is the highest quality form of capital. It is meant to absorb 
losses at the moment they occur. 
- Tier 1 capital (CET1 plus additional Tier 1 capital, AT1) must be at least 6 percent 
of risk-weighted assets at all times plus a buffer of 2.5 percent. Like CET1, AT1 
 
10 The goal of capital requirements is to ensure that banks do not take excessive risks when making new 
loans, thereby ensuring the stability of the financial system and of the economy as a whole. 
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also absorbs losses on a going-concern basis; however, AT1 instruments do not 
meet all the criteria to qualify as CET1. 
- Total capital (Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital) must be at least 8 percent of risk-
weighted assets at all times plus a buffer of 2.5 percent. Tier 2 capital is gone-
concern capital, meaning that these instruments are meant to absorb losses – when 
banks fail - before depositors and general creditors do. 
In sum, banks need to have an equity of at least 10.5 percent of their risk-weighted 
loans. This can impact on money creation, as banks may not be able to satisfy extra 
demand for credit if they cannot increase their capital. For example, if a bank has an 
amount of total loans equal to 100 million euros, then its equity must be equal to 10.5 
million euros. If the demand for credit directed to the bank increases by 10 million euros, 
the bank must be able to raise 1.05 million euros in capital; if it is not, it will not be able 
to increase credit and create more money. 
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4. THE SOLUTION TO NEGATIVE INTEREST RATES ON CREDIT 
The monetary architecture we propose in this chapter that enables negative interest rates 
on bank credit takes into account the explanation of the previous chapter of how money 
is created in modern economies. Banks create money as a result of the initiative of 
economic agents to demand credit. In turn, this depends on the interest rate charged by 
banks, which is influenced by the CB’s reference rates at which banks can borrow 
reserves. Banks can borrow any amount of reserves they need at the interest rate set by 
the CB. 
4.1 A MONETARY ARCHITECTURE THAT ENABLES NEGATIVE INTEREST 
RATES ON BANK CREDIT 
To achieve negative interest rates on bank credit it is necessary to ensure the following 
three conditions: 
- First, all the necessary funding to extend negative interest rate bank loans must 
come from the CB, to ensure that banks keep the interest paid on deposits at a 
non-negative level. 
- Second, banks must have the right to obtain from the CB at negative interest rates 
reserves equal to the full amount of credit they extend, so that it can be profitable 
to extend credit at negative rates.11 
- Third, for banks to have access to negative rates funding from the CB, they must 
prove that those reserves are being used to extend loans at negative interest rates 
to households and firms, to ensure that negative rates reach the real economy.12 
In this setting, banks would have an incentive to lend to economic agents at negative 
rates while still paying non-negative interest rates on deposits. For example, a bank would 
lend 100 euros to a business at minus 5 percent interest rate to then borrow 100 euros 
from the CB at minus 6 percent, making a profit of 1 euro (=1% x 100 euros). Banks’ 
credit to the economy would no longer be funded by deposits; it would be fully funded 
by credit from the CB. 
 
11 It should be noted that when CB’s reserves pay a negative interest rate, the existence of a reserves 
requirement rule is useless because banks will want to obtain the maximum amount of reserves they are 
allowed to in order to benefit from the negative rate. 
12 As explained in the previous chapter, banks do not need preexisting funds to extend credit: they can first 
lend the money and then obtain the necessary reserves to back the deposit created by the credit. 
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Hence, under the proposed monetary architecture, banks would operate as an 
intermediary between the CB and its credit clients. That is, if economic agents demanded 
more worthy credit at negative interest rates, then the CB would satisfy that demand via 
the banking system. 
To illustrate the dynamics of money creation under this framework, next we detail the 
process of money creation, assuming there are only two commercial banks operating in 
the economy. 
Consider a household (H1) which borrows 100 euros to buy a house at minus 5 percent 
interest rate from a commercial bank (B1). The bank creates a checkable deposit (CD1) 
of 100 euros in the account of the household and, at the same time, adds an asset to its 
balance sheet, the loan. Under the proposed monetary architecture, the bank will 
afterwards use the document, proving that it extended a mortgage loan of 100 euros, to 
borrow 100 euros at minus 6 percent from the CB. 
Now, when H1 buys the house, it transfers the 100 euros to the seller of the house 
(H2) which is likely to be a client of another bank (B2). As a result, B1 is obliged to 
transfer 100 euros in reserves to B2. 
However, in its lending activity, B2 is likely to extend a loan of, for the sake of the 
argument, 100 euros to an agent (A2). Like B1, B2 will use the document proving the 
extended loan, to borrow 100 euros at minus 6 percent from the CB. Again, for the sake 
of the argument, A2 is likely to make a payment to a customer of B1. As a result, B2 is 
obliged to transfer 100 euros in reserves to B1. However, because the payments the two 
banks must make to one another cancel out, they do not have to send reserves to each 
other. So, at the end of the day, both banks will have borrowed from the CB the reserves 
equal to 100 percent of the deposits they created, that is, 100 euros (=100% x 100 euros). 
The two loans extended by the two banks thus ended up creating 200 euros of money, 
backed by 200 euros of monetary base. Not only is it possible to lend at negative rates, 
but it also ends up being profitable for banks to do so. Each bank pays 5 euros (5 percent 
of the 100 euros loan) to the borrowers, but at the same time, it receives 6 euros from the 
CB (6 percent of the 100 euros loan). This results in a profit of 1 euro for every 100 euros 
of credit extended. 
All this is illustrated in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 - Money creation by two banks under the new monetary architecture 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
4.2 ADVANTAGES OF THIS SOLUTION 
CBs would not have to rely on quantitative easing and, therefore, avoid a situation where 
it becomes very difficult to revert it. And since the ECB is limited on the amount of 
sovereign bonds it can hold of each member-state, a future crisis might force it to change 
the limits, or at least continue to introduce new programmes such as PEPP, in which the 
purchases under this programme do not count to the imposed limits.13 Now, this does not 
seem like the best long-term solution. One of the many good things about conventional 
monetary policy is that it can be easier to revert. 
It should also be noted that in the Euro Area, negative interest rates have done a good 
job in depreciating the value of the Euro - a good way to help stimulate the economy 
through the exports channel, which is an important part of the European economy. 
Moreover, negative rates also play a crucial role in assuring low funding costs for the 
governments because they push down the whole yield curve of sovereign government 
bonds. 
Finally, it should be noted that in the presence of deeply negative rates, it is not certain 
whether economic agents would respond by increasing consumption or instead by 
increasing savings in order to counter the depreciation in their savings. This problem is 
 
13 This would probably be criticized by certain institutions, such as the German Constitutional Court, that 
forced the ECB to justify that the Assets Purchase Programme did not constitute direct financing of 
member-states. 
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fixed in our solution because negative interest rates on credit do not require negative 
interest rates on deposit accounts. 
4.3 SIMILAR MECHANISMS 
Our proposed monetary architecture would, in some ways, be similar to the current 
Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) programme of the ECB, 
through which banks can obtain long-term funding at attractive conditions from the ECB, 
depending on the amount they lend to non-financial corporations and households. The 
more loans banks extend to non-financial corporations and households (except mortgage 
loans), the more attractive the interest rate on their TLTRO borrowing becomes.14 
While TLTROs have provided incentives for bank lending to the real economy and 
led to lower interest rates in the Euro Area to households and firms (ECB, 2017), it was 
not enough to generate negative interest rates on bank credit. For a simple reason: unlike 
our solution, it does not create the necessary incentive for banks to lend at negative rates. 
On the other hand, in our proposed monetary architecture, banks would be able to 
obtain 100 percent (instead of 50 percent, which is the maximum they are currently 
allowed to obtain through TLTROs) of the extended loans in CB credit conditional on the 
confirmation that they extended those loans at negative interest rates.15 This creates an 
incentive for banks to lend at negative interest rates to be able to benefit from the CB’s 
more negative interest rate. Under our monetary framework, banks could borrow at 
negative interest rates without limit as long as they continued to extend negative interest 
rate loans to the real economy. 
4.4 EVENTUAL PROBLEMS 
A first objection that can be raised against the proposed monetary architecture is that 
people could start living off credit. For example, if the interest rate on credit is minus 6 
percent, people could borrow 100 billion euros, keep 94 billion euros to pay the debt after 
 
14 Currently, as a response to the Covid-19 crisis, the ECB eased the conditions on the most recent series 
of TLTROs (TLTRO III), reducing the interest rate on all targeted longer-term refinancing operations by 
25 basis points to minus 0.5 percent and, for banks that meet certain lending criteria, to as low as minus 1 
percent. For a bank to satisfy the lending criteria, the amount of its eligible net lending between 1 March 
2020 until 31 March 2021 must at least match the amount they extended during the same period in the 
previous year (ECB, 2020d). 
15 Previously, under TLTRO III, banks could only borrow up to 30 percent of the reference outstanding 
amount of eligible loans. As of March 2020, the borrowing allowance was increased to 50 percent of the 
stock of eligible loans (ECB, 2020e). 
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one year, and live off with the other 6 billion euros. Thus, the mechanism that should be 
used to stimulate the economy is being used as a way of earning money without any 
impact on the economy. However, this problem can be eliminated by requiring banks to 
provide loans at negative rates conditional on the use of those loans to purchase goods 
and services. 
A second problem that can be raised against the proposed monetary architecture is 
that households and firms which would otherwise use their deposits to fund expenditures 
will instead fund them with bank loans (to profit from negative rates). For example, 
instead of making a purchase with 100 euros from their own money, they could ask for 
100 euros of credit at minus 6 percent interest rate to make the purchase. At the end of 
the year, they would repay with only 94 euros.   
Now, this problem cannot be completely solved, but it can be mitigated. For instance, 
only certain types of credit would be provided at negative rates, like those for the purchase 
of a house or the investment in productive projects, and economic agents would be 
required to put down a minimum share of the whole expenditure out of their own money. 
Other types of credit, for example, for companies to pay wages or suppliers and for 
households’ consumption, would not be provided at negative rates, so as to avoid 
economic agents using credit instead of their own money. 
Note furthermore that this is not a fundamental problem. Indeed, even if some agents 
benefit from the explained arbitrage, the central objective of the proposed monetary 
architecture – to stimulate AD to FE – is achieved as effectively as intended. Besides, we 
believe that negative interest rates on credit would result in such a strong stimulus to AD 
that the CB would follow deep negative rates’ policies for a short period of time and, 
therefore, the identified arbitrage would soon be resolved. 
4.5 PSEUDO-PROBLEMS WITH THE SOLUTION 
This section is entitled pseudo-problems with the solution because there are some issues 
that at first sight might seem to be problematic, but that on closer inspection do not present 
any fundamental problem with respect to the effectiveness and/or the possibility of the 
proposed monetary architecture. 
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Distortion of the relative prices and consequent inefficiency in resources allocation 
A problem that initially occurred to us is that the proposed monetary architecture would 
reduce the relative price paid by consumers for the goods that could be bought with 
negative interest rate credit. Therefore, this would change the composition of demand and 
production of the economy in favour of those goods at the expense of others. However, 
this idea is wrong. In fact, negative rates would be used only when the economy is below 
FE. Therefore, the rise in demand and production of goods that can be bought with credit 
would be based on the use of resources that otherwise would be unemployed, not on 
resources from other productive sectors. 
Increase in the Central Bank’s liabilities 
The CB incurs losses to finance the negative interest rate loans, which will increase its 
liabilities to the point where it could surpass its assets, leading to a negative equity 
position. However, the argument that the CBs should have positive equity to be able to 
function is wrong. In a fiat money system, the money issued by the CB – which constitutes 
its debt – cannot be claimed over the CB’s assets, and the CB can always redeem its debt 
by issuing new banknotes. Therefore, the CB does not need equity (contrarily to private 
companies); it can function with negative equity. Thus, a negative equity position for the 
CB will never result in the need for capital injection by its “owners”, the Eurozone 
member States in the ECB case (see De Grauwe, 2015). 
Increase in inflation 
The funding of negative rate credit by the CB will create a substantial amount of money, 
but this will not lead to an increase in inflation when the AD is below FE. 
Inflation will only rise if AD rises above FE (see Friedman, 1968). In this case, the 
unemployment rate will fall below the natural rate of unemployment. At this level, firms 
will vie for workers and be willing to grant increases in real wages for the next period (it 
takes time for firms to start increasing wages) above productivity growth. This will lead 
to a growth rate of the nominal wage in excess of productivity growth above the current 
level of inflation, and consequently, to an acceleration in the increase in unit costs and 
prices, i.e., to higher inflation rate. Only in this case will a rise in the quantity of money 
result in an increase in inflation. 
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Arbitrage in house purchases 
Another pseudo-problem that we identified is that it may, at first sight, seem that negative 
interest rates will lead to the following arbitrage. Imagine household 1 asks for 100 euros 
to buy a house (at a minus 5 percent interest rate) and then sells the house to another 
household 2 for 100 euros (if the house keeps the same value) and repays the loan of 95 
euros to the bank, making 5 euros of profit. Household 2 does the same thing, selling the 
house to household 3, also making 5 euros of profit. And imagine that household 3 repeats 
the same process, and so on. Thus, each household has the incentive to ask for credit to 
buy a house and sell it (making a profit of 5 percent). 
However, a closer inspection reveals that this is not a problem. First, the purchase and 
sale of a house cannot be immediate since households must wait one year to benefit from 
the 5 percent interest rate. Thus, we will have the same house transacted, say, 10 times 
between each of the 10 different households, profiting 5 euros each year. Therefore, this 
hypothetical scenario would be the same as if one single person bought the house for a 
10-year period and never sold it. That person would receive 5 euros of interest for each 
year of the 10-year mortgage. The effect on the quantity of money and on AD would also 
be the same in both scenarios. 
Note furthermore that, under the proposed architecture, credit at negative rates could 
be restricted to new houses, since the purpose is to stimulate construction and 
consequently, output and employment. 
Low banks’ profitability 
Constâncio (2019) has argued that negative rates should come to an end because they 
have proved to be harmful to banks’ profitability and thus are endangering the stability 
of the financial sector. 
However, this does not have to be the case. The only plausible reason for low rates to 
generate low profits is the following. Imagine a household that bought a 100 euros house 
in June 2007 when the ECB’s refinancing rate was 4 percent. The bank applied a spread 
of 0.25 percent over the ECB’s rate and funded the 100 euros in (say) the following way: 
- 20 euros from the Interbank Money Market (IMM), for which it paid an interest 
equal to the ECB’s (4 percent). 
- 50 euros from time deposits, for which it paid 3 percent interest. 
- 30 euros from checkable deposits, for which it paid 0 percent interest. 
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The financial margin was 4.25 percent charged on the loan minus the weighted 
average of 4, 3, and 0 percent (2.3 percent). Therefore, the financial margin (1.95 percent) 
was way larger than the spread (0.25 percent) of the credit interest rate on the ECB’s rate.  
However, when the ECB reduced the interest rate from 4 percent to 0 percent, the 
interest charged decreased from 4.25 percent to 0.25 percent. What about the funding 
cost? The interest rate paid on the IMM also fell by the same 4 percentage points, but the 
interest paid on time deposits decreased by only 3 percentage points, and the interest 
charged on checkable deposits did not fall at all. The overall result was a collapse in the 
financial margin, from 1.95 percent to 0.25 percent. 
In sum, the low rate generated small profits because the bank had committed the 
mistake of setting the spread on the ECB interest rate, instead of setting the spread on the 
average cost of funding. The bank did this because it had never occurred to it that the 
interest rate would one day fall to zero.  
More generally, why should the margins (between the interest banks receive and the 
interest they pay for funding) depend on the interest being positive, zero, or negative? In 
the long run, that margin should depend only on the intensity of the competition between 
banks (the larger the intensity, the lower the margin) and on the logistic non-financial 
costs (the larger the costs, the larger the margin will have to be to afford it). 
Therefore, in the long run, the level of the CB interest rate should not affect the profits 
of banks. Bankers should start fixing their price as any other business does: setting a 
margin over the variable cost (the spread of the interest rate charged over the average 
funding cost, and not merely on the ECB’s rate), in order to generate enough money to 
cover their fixed costs and to generate a return on capital at least equal to the normal 
level.16 
By the way, note that this means that, if the legal capital requirements increase, banks 
should increase the spread over the average cost of funding so as to keep the profit rate at 
the normal level. This would also have implied that, when the ECB reduced the interest 
rate towards 0 percent or negative rates, the spread included in the credit interest rate 
should have increased in order to keep the financial margin unchanged. 
Conclusion: there should be no reason for zero or negative rates – or, for that matter, 
capital requirements - to have any permanent effect on banks’ profits. 
 
16 For an explanation on how businesses set their prices (profit margin over their average total cost) see 
Leão (2011, pp. 121-122). 
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Creation of Zombie firms 
Another critique of negative rates made by Constâncio (2019) is that today some firms 
only survive due to the low-interest-rate environment and that under positive rates, those 
firms would not be efficient enough to compete and stay “alive”. Therefore, the negative 
rates’ experience should come to an end.  
However, this is not necessarily a problem. Indeed, following this logic, the CB 
should not set its policy rate equal to zero either; it should raise it to, say, 2 percent to 
avoid the creation of inefficient firms that would only survive at 0 percent interest rate. 
But then one could then argue that at an interest rate of 2 percent, some indebted 
companies would not be efficient enough to operate under a higher interest rate, and so 
the policy rate should be raised to, say, 4 percent. 
In sum, the economy will always adjust to the current cost of funding. At any interest 
rate level, there will always exist indebted companies that would not survive under higher 
rates. Thus, at any moment in time, the interest rate should be at the level that guarantees 
AD equal to FE. 




The global financial crisis of 2008/09 forced CBs to reduce their policy rates towards 
their effective lower bounds. On the other hand, because of the low economic growth of 
the subsequent years, monetary authorities did not have the opportunity to raise their 
policy rates to a comfortable level - that is, to a level where they would have room to 
lower them by enough to counter a future economic downturn. So, in the Covid-19 crisis, 
they had to resort to alternative monetary instruments – mainly, expansionary fiscal 
policy implicitly financed by quantitative easing of CBs.  
However, this must not be the case. If the monetary framework set out in this paper 
were in force, CBs would have been in a position to cut interest rates to minus 3, 5, or 
even 10 percent. Besides, implementing that monetary structure would not have required 
drastic changes to the current process of money creation. 
The monetary framework proposed in this paper is based on three pillars: (i) the funds 
needed by banks to extend loans at negative rates should all come from the CB, which 
will charge a negative interest rate for those funds, (ii) banks must be free to borrow 
reserves equal to 100 percent of the loans they extend at negative rates and (iii) to have 
access to CB reserves at negative rates, banks must prove those reserves are supporting 
loans to the real economy at negative interest rates. 
The first pillar ensures that banks do not fund their loans with deposits and, therefore, 
negative rates on bank credit does not require negative rates on deposits. The second pillar 
ensures that banks can profit from the operation (for example, banks will only lend at, 
say, minus 3 percent, if they are guaranteed the access to reserves equal to 100 percent of 
the money lent at an interest rate equal to, say, minus 4 percent). And, the third pillar is 
fundamental to encourage banks to extend credit at negative rates. Otherwise, if 
competition was not intense, banks could borrow from the CB at deep negative interest 
rates and then extend credit at positive rates, obtaining an enormous spread on the loans. 
A monetary framework based on these three pillars is thus able to generate negative 
nominal interest rates on bank credit while allowing banks to pay zero nominal interest 
rates to their depositors. 
We find only two objections to our proposal. First, people could start living off credit 
obtained at negative interest rates. Second, households and firms which would otherwise 
use their deposits to fund expenditures would instead fund them through loans obtained 
at negative interest rates. While the first objection can be easily prevented by requiring 
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banks to provide negative rate loans conditional on their use to purchase goods and 
services, the second cannot be solved entirely. However, it can be minimized through 
loan-to-value requirements and by requiring that only certain types of credit can be 
obtained at negative interest rates. Besides, the presence of such arbitrage would not 
undermine the purpose of the policy, which is to bring AD back to FE. Overall, we 
conclude that nominal negative interest rates on bank credit can, in fact, be achieved 
through minimal changes in the current process of money creation. 
Although there might be other viable options to break the lower bound - the removal 
of cash from circulation or the increase in the cost of switching from deposits to cash - 
such policies would not be accepted by the public because they would imply deep 
negative rates on deposit accounts. This does not happen when the negative rates are 
entirely introduced via the credit channel. 
However, one possible criticism to our proposed monetary architecture is that 
implementing such policies has never been done historically, so we cannot fully anticipate 
the effects in the economy. While this is true, not being able to stimulate the economy 
under the current monetary framework, implying very prolonged periods with output 
below potential, is a far greater cost that most developed countries face nowadays. 
Finally, it should be noted that the discussion of solutions to break the lower bound is 
not only of academic interest but of a contribution to help increase the CBs capacity to 
respond to sharp economic downfalls. Hence, our paper might prove useful to monetary 
authorities or at least to help further extend the study on this subject that has yet received 
little attention from the literature. 
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